Breaking the Spiral of Silence - with Yuen Ho, Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Political Economy
Self-censorship is pervasive in today's opinion climate, which distorts political discourse and decision making processes that rely on public opinion. What drives self-censorship, and how can misperceptions about public opinion be corrected? The Spiral of Silence theory offers insights, positing that people who hold views perceived as socially inappropriate tend to self-censor, generating a distribution of expressed views that is skewed towards appropriate opinions. If the attention paid to silence is limited, this can exacerbate self-censorship and create an equilibrium where only socially appropriate views are expressed and considered dominant. We experimentally test this hypothesis based on a simple model in which self-censorship and limited attention to silence interact to jointly establish equilibrium norms. In our experiment, college students discuss controversial political and socioeconomic issues together. Students with socially inappropriate views self-censor to a significant degree. Given the limited attention students pay to silence, self-censorship amplifies over time. We experimentally increase the salience of silence and show that this both leads to more accurate beliefs about public opinion and increases the diversity of views expressed. Because inference and expression amplify each other, different levels of attention to silence produce divergent social norms in equilibrium.
Correlation Neglect on Social Media: Effects on Civil Service Applications in China - with Yixi Jiang, Ziqi Lu, Revise and Resubmit, The Economic Journal
Social media, on which signals are often correlated, has become a primary source of information. How do people form beliefs when reading correlated signals online? In a field experiment on Weibo, we exposed Chinese college students to redundant negative posts about civil service jobs. Consequently, they developed a 0.16 standard deviation more negative view of these jobs and were 11% less likely to register for civil service exams, compared to the control group. We find the same effect in a supplemental online survey experiment, and the effect is moderated by attention. Our study demonstrates that correlation neglect can affect beliefs and real-life outcomes, including career choice.
How Awareness of Media Bias Affects Reaction to News: Field and Experimental Evidence from Microblog Users - with Juanjuan Meng, Xi Weng, Revise and Resubmit, Management Science
This paper examines how awareness of media bias affects news consumers' reactions to news. Combining data from Chinese Microblog users and an online experiment that varies whether news sources are disclosed, we find that news consumers are more likely to repost news with a political inclination inconsistent with the media outlet's general ideology, with causal evidence from the channel of strategic inferences about media bias. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that individuals with Bayesian updating and level-k thinking abilities exhibit stronger effects. We also demonstrate that simply reminding people of media bias can be an effectively method to nudge sophisticated reactions.
Selection and Sorting when Supervisors have Discretion: Experimental Evidence from a Tanzanian Factory - with Yuen Ho
Almost all firms rely on supervisor discretion to select and motivate workers. But what are the benefits and costs of doing so? In partnership with a large garment manufacturing firm in Tanzania, we implement a series of field experiments to examine supervisor discretion in the selection of workers for promotion to managerial positions. In a first field experiment with supervisors, we randomize whether supervisors face financial incentives based on the quality of their referrals. In a complementary experiment with workers, we randomly vary whether supervisor referrals are emphasized in the selection process when workers make application decisions. Our results show that discretion crowds in supervisors’ private information about the managerial potential of workers. Supervisors use private information beyond what the firm could infer from existing administrative data, workers’ self-assessments, or coworker referrals. However, discretion also generates costs for firms. Supervisor referrals are not perfectly aligned with the firm’s objectives, and supervisors show preferences consistent with gender bias and favoritism. Furthermore, discretion is disliked by workers and reduces the number of workers who apply for promotion. Despite the costs of discretion, supervisors select workers with significantly higher measured managerial ability relative to more objective selection methods.
Inefficient Advising and Blame Concern - with Yixi Jiang
People tend to withhold advice when they fear being blamed for unfavorable outcomes, which hinders the spread of valuable information. To investigate how blame concerns deter advice-giving and to test the effectiveness of communication in alleviating blame concerns, we conduct an online experiment using a two-by-two treatment design that randomly varies whether advisees can punish advisors and whether advisors can send messages. We find that potential punishment from advisees deters advice-giving by approximately 30%. Additionally, we observe gender differences in the effectiveness of messages: for male advisors, messages reduce the perceived likelihood and severity of punishment, alleviating blame concerns and increasing advising rates, while the effect is not significant for female advisors.